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agents actions factorization in a system is proved. The definition of absolutely indiscernible 
actions is provided.
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1. Introduction
The recent trend of research in the area of information security is ever 
more shifting to the field of information awareness management in conflict 
systems. This trend is quite reasonable. Vulnerabilities are not embedded 
deliberately in an information security system (except the cases when a 
defender is interested in). Inevitable presence of vulnerabilities is caused 
by the complexity of current information systems. It was discovered that 
successful attacks become more simple with the increasing complexity of a 
system. This law-like regularity was called “The Adam And Eve Paradox” 
[1]. Information asymmetry between attacker and defender is a significant 
restriction in the area of security. This is when a defender’s time to develop 
the system is limited while an attacker`s is normally not. Furthermore an 
attacker has access to information about the software vulnerabilities and 
shortcomings which are found after the system development process has 
been completed.
Recently there appeared a lot of researches dedicated to overcoming 
this asymmetry. The majority of them address to protection technologies 
based on Moving Target Defense (MTD). The principle of this technology 
consists in transforming the system from a static type to a dynamic one 
[2, 3]. Temporarily changing its structure an information system makes 
the research process difficult for an attacker. Information obtained in the 
process of reconnaissance becomes irrelevant the next moment.
The first research works in this area appeared about five years ago. 
At the same time one can observe the significant increase in a number of 
research papers in this field within the last couple of years. There were 
proposed such solutions as defense of networks from remote scanning [4, 
5], defense from DDoS-attacks [6], virtualization technologies protected 
from research [7], etc. Some solutions based on MTD were accepted as 
standards in the area of software development, e.g. Address-Space Layout 
Randomization (ASLR) [8], which has been used in all common operating 
systems over the last couple of years.
However, formalization of processes for obtaining information 
while interacting with the system (i.e. information about the system 
itself) can be considered as a constraining factor to extend the research 
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in this area. Thus, we cannot define precisely which particular elements 
of an information system need to be hidden and how to hide them; what 
information will be revealed to an intruder in the process of interaction 
with the system; if a defender can be sure that the system is adequate 
enough to declare security; how agents can hide their actions in the system 
and how to oppose it, etc.
These have undoubtedly been the most frequent causes of concern 
in researches that have been carried out for formalizing the general 
problem of protection against reconnaissance [9], formalizing the process 
for information flow analysis with graphs [10], proposing an algorithm 
to design self-complicating systems [11]. In this paper we formalize 
the notion of action taking into account shifts in the agent`s awareness 
and structure two problems of protection from research on the model 
designed. The first problem deals with restrictions for agents to achieve 
specific conditions due to their awareness, the second one concerns hiding 
agents` actions in the system. The scope of functional steganography is 
defined in a similar way to classic (content) steganography.
2. Construction of a functional model
In this section we present mathematical notions and illustrate 
their interpretations in terms of real objects. This method allows one to 
understand the formalized model more clearly.
Consider the set 1= { , , }mT T T  of vectors 
 1
= ( , , ) , = 1, , , ,i i i T in j jT a a i m a A∈ 
where each Aj is a finite subset of a set of positive integers = {1, 2, },  
consisting of nj elements ( )= .j jA n 
Definition 2.1: We call the vectors T i by states, and the set T by set of states. 
Interpretation: The state of any real system can be represented by 
means of its elements’ states. E.g., a system with distribution of users 
rights to access can be described by means of such entities as roles, which 
states are sets of access rights; files with discrete set of their content; users 
with the states of their roles, etc.
Let IK be a vector of length n, consisting of s zeros and n – s “ones”, 
namely 
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 1
1
( , ,
= = (1, ,1, 0,1, ,1, 0,1, ,1) ({0,1}) ,)s
kk s
T n
K k k
I I ∈

  
where the zeroes are in positions with numbers 1 , , sk k  with 
11 < < .sk k n   Let KI  be a vector = ,n KKI I I−  where  In = (1, ..., 1) is the 
unit vector of the length n.
By iKT  we denote a vector * ,
i
KT I  where operation * means term-
wise multiplication of vector elements: 
 1 1 1 1( , , ) * ( , , ) = ( , , ) .
T T T
n n n na a b b a b a b  
Thus vector iKT  is obtained from vector T 
i by substituting coordinates 
with numbers k1, ..., ks into zeros.
Definition 2.2: We say that the states T i and T j from T are K-equivalent 
and denote ,
K
jiT T  if * = * .ji K KT I T I
Interpretation: Within any real system some elements stay 
indiscernible. It can be either the whole element or some of the element’s 
states. Hence an agent might not notice system transformation from 
one state to another. Thus two states stay equivalent for a particular 
individual. E.g., modifying the contents of a file, which is not accessible 
for the individual.
Let = {1, , },M m  and 2 = {( , ) : , , }M i j i j M i j≠ ∈ ≠  be a set of ordered 
pairs of elements from M with distinct coordinates.
Definition 2.3: Denote the ordered pair ( , )jiT T  by F ij, where 2( , ) .i j M≠∈  
We say that F ij defines transformation from the state T i into the state T j 
and denote it by : .ij jiF T T→  Define composition of transformations 
ij jkF F  by = .ij jk ikF F F  
It is convenient to represent a set of states with a specified set of 
transformations with a directed graph. Its vertices correspond to states 
and its edges correspond to transformations between states.
Definition 2.4: We say that the transformation F ij is K-enabled, if the 
states T i and T j are not K-equivalent, but they are K -equivalent, i.e. 
* *ji K KT I T I≠  and * = *
ji
K K
T I T I  hold. 
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Definition 2.5: If B is a subset of 2 ,M≠  we denote the set 
 
= { : ( , ) , — enabled},
K
ij ijB
KF F i j B F K
 
∈ −  

by BKF  and call it by the set of the agent B-K. 
Interpretation: Any action within a system can be denoted by 
transformation of its elements’ states. An individual cannot observe some 
states of the elements, so he/she cannot make a shift, modifying the system 
elements. This claim contradicts classical idea in the area of information 
security because of “blind” attacks. One should be more careful when using 
the term “observability” referring to protection against reconnaissance. 
E.g., if an attacker has write access to a file, but no read permission, he 
might get indirect channel of leakage in time. While putting data he/she 
checks whether errors occur in the program or whether it requires more 
time to run. A significant number of blind injection attacks to brake codes 
and ciphers are performed using this approach. If the state of an object 
is not observable at all, it can be used in future to produce other actions, 
that will provide information whether it has been transformed to a target 
state or not. Thus we cannot consider the situation when an individual 
produces any actions with absolutely unobservable elements.
Definition 2.6: We say that the state qT T∈  is B-K-attainable for the state 
,pT T∈  if there exists sequence 1 1 2, , , ri qpi i iF F F  of BKF  such that 
 1 1 2 = : .r
i qpi i i pq p qF F F F T T→ 
Let 1
1
= , , l
l
BB
K KF F F
 
 
 

 be a collection of agents’ sets.
 
Definition 2.7: We say that the state qT T∈  is F-attainable for the 
state ,pT T∈  and denote ,
F
p qT T→  if there exists sequence of states 
0 1= , , , =p ppp qrT T T T T  from T such that for any {1, , }i r∈   there exists 
{1, , }j l∈   such that the state piT  is Bj-Kj-attainable for the state 1 .
piT −  
Let 0T T∈  be an initial state, and TN be a certain subset of T called 
undesirable set of states.
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Definition 2.8: For certain T, T 0 Œ T and F by attainability set we call the 
set of F-attainable states for T0: 
 
0= { : , attainable for }.q q qAT T T T T F T∈ −
Definition 2.9: We call the collection 0, , ,NT T T F〈 〉  by investigated system. 
Definition 2.10: By investigated system graph we call directed graph 
with the set of vertices corresponding to the set of system states and with 
the set of edges corresponding to the set of all transformations, that are 
K-enabled for at least one agent in a system. 
Denote: 
 
0 0, = ,, , , =
1, .
A N
N
A N
T TT T T F
T T
 ∩ ∅〈 〉 
∩ ≠ ∅
 
Interpretation: For a certain system a set of undesirable states could 
be a set of states with unauthorized access to resources or denial-of-service 
states. By identifying all the actions in the system, we are able to define 
weather it can transform to undesirable state, e.g. due to security policy 
violation.
For such investigated system we can describe the following 
“protection against reconnaissance” tasks.
Task 1: Which conditions applied to investigated system provide the 
equality 0, , , = 0?NT T T F〈 〉 
Task 2: If for the given investigated system 0, , , = 1,NT T T F〈 〉   how 
can we get 0, , , = 0NT T T F〈 〉   by modifying equivalence relations (and, 
therefore, agents sets)? 
Task 3: Under which conditions applied to investigated system, the 
problem of matching of the given transformation in a system to a certain 
agent’s action is intractable (computationally complex) or unfeasible when 
we are limited by the equivalence relations of certain agents? 
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3. Formalization of the first task
Consider the system with one agent: 
 
1
1
0, , , BN KT T T F
 
 
 
Theorem 3.1: If :
K1
j jN 0T T T T∀ ∈   then .1
1
B0 N
KT,T ,T , F = 0
 
 
 
 
Proof: The proof follows from the fact that any attainable state T i Œ T A 
satisfies 
1
0 .
K
jT T  
Theorem 3.1 might be interpreted as follows: if for any undesirable 
state there exists attainable state, indiscernible for the only agent, then 
the system will never transform into this state, given that indiscernible 
elements were not initially in undesirable state.
Similarly one can consider the system with more than one agent 
(several agents): 
 
1
1
0, , , , = , , .l
l
BBN
K KT T T F F F F
 〈 〉  
 

Theorem 3.2: If :
K
j jN 0T T T T∀ ∈   where ,1 lK = K * * K  then 
.1
1
B0 N
KT,T ,T , F = 0
 
 
 
 
 
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1, taking into 
account that none of the agents can change the element from the subset 
of indiscernible for any agent elements at any stage (i.e. coordinates 
corresponding to “1” coordinates of the vector 1= * * ).lK K K  
Let us now introduce the notion of reduced graph to simplify 
operating with graphs.
Definition 3.1: Let us call an island a set of system states, each of which 
is F-attainable for the others. We will use the notion of reduced graph 
to denote a graph of the system in which each island is identified with 
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a vertex, and each edge, coming in- or out of any state of the island, 
accordingly, comes in- or out of the vertex, corresponding to this island. 
Denote by O a collection of all islands in the system. Now we are able 
to construct a graph OG which vertices are elements of the set O and the 
transition from Oa to Ob exists if, and only if there exists transition F 
ij such 
that T i Œ Oa, and T 
j Œ Ob.
Theorem 3.3: If T 0 Œ Og T 
N Œ Oh, where Og and Oh are vertices of the reduced graph 
of the system, denoting the islands of the system, then 1
1
B0 N
KT,T ,T , F = 1
 
 
 
 if 
and only if there exist a path from Og to Oh in the graph OG. 
Let us consider an example. There are 4 modules within a system. 
These modules interact with each other. Let us denote only two states for 
each module: “0” means that module is not compromised and “1” means 
that module is compromised. Thus, vector (x1, x2, x3, x4), where xi Œ {0,1} 
identifies the state of the system. Suppose that attacker has an access to the 
first module and he can further compromise it sequentially as he knows the 
rules of their interacting. Thus we can mark down all F-attainable actions 
in the system. Let us suppose that compromising of the last module is an 
undesirable state of the system. Thus, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 postulate that 
it is possible to make the system safe by making this state indiscernible for 
an attacker and defining the vector I = (*, *, *, 0), if the initial state of the 
system is T 0 = (*, *, *, 0).
However it can be unfeasible to make the fourth element of the 
system indiscernible. Then, in accordance with the Theorem 3.3 we can 
build a graph of islands and protect from research crucial elements which 
break graph paths.
4. Formalization of the second task
If, in a real system, we obtain 1
1
0, , , = 1,BN KT T T F
 
 
 
 we can 
transform it to the state 1
1
0, , , = 0BN KT T T F
 
 
 
 by means of changing the 
vector IK. To make some system elements undesirable for the agent we 
replace one with zero in the vector IK at the corresponding position.
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For the vector 
 1
1
( , ,
= = (1, ,1, 0,1, ,1, 0,1, ,1) ({0,1}) ,)s
kk s
T n
K k k
I I ∈

  
let us denote K0 as a set
 0 1= { , , }sK k k
of zero coordinates places in the vector IK. Consider the family of the sets 
K¢:
 0 0 0= where — non empty subset = {1, , }\ .K K A A K n K∪ −′ 
Thus, vector IK ¢ is a vector IK which has all zero coordinates of the 
vector IK and some “1” coordinates of the vector IK are replaced with zeros. 
Each vector IK ¢ defines its equivalence relation .
K

Let us assign a nonnegative real number 0a  to each set A. We will 
call this number by weight transformation coefficient.
For each agent the set 2M≠  is permanent, and the sets of B¢-enabled 
transformations (subsets of 2M≠ ) will change with K¢ so that sets 
B
KF
′
′  will 
be the subsets of .BKF
Let us formulate the optimization problem.
Given the family of agents’ sets 1
1
= , , l
l
BB
K KF F F
 
 
 

 with 
0, , , = 1NT T T F〈 〉   it is required to find a family of sets 1= { , , }F lA A A′   
with minimal weight 1=F la a a′ + +  so that 
0, , , = 0,NT T T F〈 〉′   where 
1
1
= , , .l
l
BB
K KF F F
′′
′ ′
 
′  
 

 In other words we should find 
 0
min : , , , =0
( ) = min .
N FF T T T F
a F a ′
〈 〉′ ′
′
 
When transforming the states of real systems to the T set the main 
problem is to find independent elements being components of the vector 
1= ( , , ) .
i i i T
nT a a  Independence is the absence of changes in one element’s 
state with changing the state of the others. E.g., the state of the web-server 
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will depend on the state of the virtual machine it is placed in. However, two 
virtual machines on the same computer are most likely to be independent.
In real systems indiscernibility of states can be achieved in several 
ways: 
1.  Restriction of access to an element by making it unobservable. It 
is the most obvious and simple way but certainly it is not always 
practicable for different parts of the system interact with each other 
and may not be isolated at all times. Unobservability makes an 
element isolated. 
2.  Changing an element’s conception quicker than the time required 
for the response from the element to an agent. Reconnaissance and 
recognition of elements’ states requires some time. For example 
the time for remote scanning of hosts in a network or read time 
of connection parameters within one session. When elements are 
turned into constantly changing ones then obtaining a correct image 
of a system or its elements may be impracticable. That solution is 
more realistic to implement from the technical point of view and was 
referred to as MTD technology in the introduction. The drawback 
of such systems lies in the inability to defend the MTD itself from 
research as it remains stereotypic. One of the options to solve that 
problem is a decentralized self-complicating information system in 
modification principles of which are not programmed during the 
design stage [14]. 
3.  Setting up a functional “disguise” and making the system’s 
functional element indiscernible. In that case it becomes unclear 
what each element actually is (solution to the second task). Hence, 
as it is impossible to distribute elements of set T correctly those 
elements become indiscernible. One of the innovative ways to solve 
that problem is set out as an example of establishing an absolutely 
indiscernible data transfer channel [15]. 
5. Formalization of the third task
There are two fundamental approaches to data hiding in the area 
of cryptography. The first approach uses perfect ciphers. Ciphertext 
is literally meaningless for a cryptanalyst as it does not provide any 
information about the original message. The second approach is based on 
hypothesis that attacker can use only polynomial time algorithms. Thus 
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there is a class of hardly compromised cryptographic primitives. The 
complexity of their compromising increases very fast (non polynomial) 
depending on some parameters (generally, key size). Within this paper 
we will consider data hiding in terms of computation complexity and 
elements indiscernibility for agents.
The first part of the problem consists in possibility to compare 
transition in a system with the action of an agent in condition of complete 
information about the system. Let us consider a system with three 
agents and an action F14. Action F14 does not belong to any set of agents’ 
actions. But after transition in a system action F14 may be represented as a 
composition of agents’ actions. Let us suppose,
 
31 2
1 2 3
14 12 23 34 12 23 34= , , , .BB BK K KF F F F F F F F F F∈ ∈ ∈ 
Definition 5.1: Trivial action is an action that could not be represented as a 
composition of other actions which do not contain the action itself. 
Definition 5.2: A simple composition is a representation of action that 
could not be denoted with the smaller number of elements. I.e., if there 
exists representation 14 15 54= ,F F F  then 14 12 23 34=F F F F   is not simple. 
Suppose in our case representation 14 12 23 34=F F F F   is simple. We 
can conclude that system transformation F can be performed only with 
collaborative actions of agents 1, 2 and 3. However, it is not so, as each 
of these actions can be non trivial. Let us show the whole composition of 
actions (Figure 1).
Each action is marked with the number of agents composing the set 
of actions it belongs to.
Thus, action F12 may be represented as a composition 15 52 ,F F  
where 2 1
2 1
15 52, .B BK KF F F F∈ ∈  In its turn, action F
15 may be represented as a 
composition 17 75 ,F F  where 1 2 1
1 2 1
17 17 75, .B B BK K KF F F F F F∈ ∈ ∈
As a result, we can represent action F14 as composition: 
 
14 17 75 52 29 98 86 63 34= (( ) ) ((( ) ) ) .F F F F F F F F F      
Each action in this composition is an element of the set 1
1
.BKF  
Consequently, agent 1 can perform transformation F14 independently.
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Analyzing real systems, when we see the transition, we generally, 
compare it with the simplest composition. However, it could be considered 
incorrect in terms of digital forensics. In this case there occurs an important 
question whether a single agent or a group of agents could perform this 
action or not.
If each element of a system has more than one state, that is, 
= 2i iA n    for each = 1, , .i k  such system can be called nondegenerate
Theorem 5.1: Complexity of the task to attain the state of nondegenerate system 
increases exponentially with the number of system elements. 
Proof: Note that the number N of vectors 1( , , )ka a  of the length k, where 
, = 2,i i i ia A A n∈     can be estimated by 
 1= 2 .
k
kN n n⋅ ⋅ 
Thus, since complexity to find connected vertices is defined by the 
number of graph’s vertices, complexity to define elements attainability 
will be not less than O(2k). 
The third task may be specified as follows. Suppose there occurred 
transformation from state T0 to T ¢ŒTN. We need to find all the paths 
executing this transformation. Solution of this task allows us to define 
whether the given transformation is performed by the single system agent 
or not.
Figure 1 
Decomposition of a simple chain of nontrivial actions 
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This task can be solved by considering the graph with edges which 
correspond to the only agent with traditional algorithms of graph-based 
pathfinding. If transformation is not attainable for each separate agent 
(without collaboration) we can start a new task of state attainability by the 
pair of agents, etc.
Theorem 5.2: If there exists system with N states and t agents, then complexity 
of the task whether j Œ(1, ..., t) of agents 1
1
= , , ss jS
S s sj
BBB
K K KF F F
  
 
  
  can perform 
transformation from state T 0 to T¢ Œ TN in cooperation, is ,S
S
Bj
t KS
O N C F ⋅ +  ∑    
where the sum is taken over all j-element sampling s1, ..., sj, and S
S
B
KF   denotes 
the number of elements in the set of enabled actions for agents 1
1
, , ,ss j
s sj
BB
K KF F  and 
= !/( !( )!)jtC t j t j−  are binomial coefficients. 
Proof: There exists a graph for each sampling of j-elements set from 
t-elements set, so the complexity of pathfinding algorithm in the oriented 
graph between two fixed vertices equals the sum of the number of vertices 
and the number of edges. 
The top value of this computation complexity can be obviously 
estimated with the variable
 
max .S
S
B j
K tS
O N F C  + ⋅    
 
As a result we can conclude that the problem to compare transformations 
in a system with the agents’ actions may be computationally complex 
even when we have all the information about the system and its agents. 
It allows agents perform “hiding” actions in the systems with the large 
number of elements.
The second part of the task is defined as infeasibility to compare 
transformation with the specified agents’ actions if we are limited with 
equivalence relation of some agents. In other words a researcher is 
placed “inside” the system and, as an agent, tries to recognize an agent 
or a group of agents changing the state of the system. This task is always 
solvable if he is equipped with complete information and has unrestricted 
computational resources. However, the task can have no solutions from 
the agents ‘point of view as some system elements are indiscernible. I.e., 
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transformation in a system performed by specific agents with functional 
decomposition can be unobservable.
As a result the system can suddenly appear to be transformed to a 
new state for some agents. The most suitable notion to denote this problem 
is “functional steganography”.
Definition 5.3: We will call actions F jk and F st K-equivalent ( )
K
ij pqF F  if 
K
jiT T  and .
K
p qT T
Definition 5.4: Functional steganography subset for the B-K agent is a set 
of actions (st) ,B BK KF F⊂  so that for each action 
(st)ij B
KF F∈  and each agent B¢-
K¢ from \ BKF F  there exists action F 
pq so that 
K
ij pqF F
′
  and 
 
\ \( ) .pq B BK K
B B
K K
F F F F ′′
≠′
≠′
 
 ∈
 
 

 The scope of functional steganography consists in finding transitions 
in a system represented as functional decomposition of an agent’s actions, 
indiscernible by other agents.
Some practical tasks can be solved with the help of such subsets. 
E.g., hiding actions of security administrator in information system. The 
following conclusion can be useful for this task:
Corollary 5.1: If one of the agents in a system has access to all system elements 
and the set of non empty indiscernible actions is available to other agents, then 
functional steganography subset for this agent is never empty. 
This approach can be implemented in policies of access control. E.g., 
discretionary access control where all object are independent a priori (like 
a HRU security model). In this case, indiscernibility can be considered as 
absence of read permission in the access matrix.
An action F ij of agent B-K is absolutely indiscernible (indiscernible for 
all other agents) if for each agent B¢-K¢ from \ BKF F  there exists action F
pq, 
so that 
K
ij pqF F
′
  and pq BKF F∉  (i.e., no other system agent can identify this 
action as an action of agent B-K).
As a result, reasoning by analogy with cryptography, we could define 
absolutely indiscernible agents’ actions in a system and indiscernible 
agents’ actions based on computing complexity of pathfinding in graphs, 
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growing very fast (non polynomial) depending on the number of system 
elements.
6. Conclusion
The present paper resolved the problem of interdependence between 
awareness and agents’ actions into a formalized model. The model 
enables defining attainability of undesirable states in the system from one 
agent’s point of view. Methods provided herein can be used to develop 
system topology in accordance with Moving Target Defense which is 
currently widely applied in information security solutions. It can assist in 
establishing the systems protected from penetration or promote solving 
the task of functional indiscernibility in system dynamics and hiding 
agents’ actions in the system (functional steganography).
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